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Ned Schmidt
Ned Schmidt

Rsa Two Factor Authentication Pdf Download !!EXCLUSIVE!!



I'm implementing a secure network project one part of which is a mobile VPN communication via Cisco ASA-5525-X with 2 factor authentication using RSA SecurID tokens. However so far I couldn't find any documentation which would more or less clearly explain the configuration procedure.




Rsa Two Factor Authentication Pdf Download



This document describes the steps required to configure external two-factor authentication for management access on Firepower Management Center (FMC). In this example, the FMC administrator authenticates against the ISE server and an additional authentication in the form of push notification is sent by Duo Authentication Proxy server to the administrator's mobile device.


Ensure to configure the ikey, skey, and api_host parameters. In order to obtain these values, login to your Duo account ( ) and navigate to Applications > Protect an Application. Next, select RADIUS authentication application as shown in the image:


On ISE server navigate to Operations > RADIUS > Live Logs, find the username used for authentication on FMC and select the detail authentication report under the detail column. In here you must verify if the authentication is succeeded as shown in the image:


(Two-factor authentication available in EFT Server Enterprise) Authenticating with RADIUS/RSA SecurID can be a multi-step process on your first login, as you establish your PIN. The server can request additional information from the user or device, such as a secondary password. The secondary password prompt can cause problems with SFTP clients who may not allow multiple prompts.


Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is an access security product used to verify a user's identity at login. It adds two or more identity-checking steps to user logins by use of secure authentication tools. Adding MFA keeps your data secure. With Cisco Secure Access by Duo, it's easier than ever to integrate and use.


Duo natively integrates to secure any application or platform, so whether you're adding two-factor authentication (2FA) to meet compliance goals or building a full zero trust framework, Duo is the perfect addition to your security portfolio with tools like:


These guidelines provide technical requirements for federal agencies implementing digital identity services and are not intended to constrain the development or use of standards outside of this purpose. These guidelines focus on the authentication of subjects interacting with government systems over open networks, establishing that a given claimant is a subscriber who has been previously authenticated. The result of the authentication process may be used locally by the system performing the authentication or may be asserted elsewhere in a federated identity system. This document defines technical requirements for each of the three authenticator assurance levels. This publication supersedes corresponding sections of NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-63-2.


The ongoing authentication of subscribers is central to the process of associating a subscriber with their online activity. Subscriber authentication is performed by verifying that the claimant controls one or more authenticators (called tokens in earlier versions of SP 800-63) associated with a given subscriber. A successful authentication results in the assertion of an identifier, either pseudonymous or non-pseudonymous, and optionally other identity information, to the relying party (RP).


This document provides recommendations on types of authentication processes, including choices of authenticators, that may be used at various Authenticator Assurance Levels (AALs). It also provides recommendations on the lifecycle of authenticators, including revocation in the event of loss or theft.


This technical guideline applies to digital authentication of subjects to systems over a network. It does not address the authentication of a person for physical access (e.g., to a building), though some credentials used for digital access may also be used for physical access authentication. This technical guideline also requires that federal systems and service providers participating in authentication protocols be authenticated to subscribers.


The strength of an authentication transaction is characterized by an ordinal measurement known as the AAL. Stronger authentication (a higher AAL) requires malicious actors to have better capabilities and expend greater resources in order to successfully subvert the authentication process. Authentication at higher AALs can effectively reduce the risk of attacks. A high-level summary of the technical requirements for each of the AALs is provided below; see Sections 4 and 5 of this document for specific normative requirements.


To satisfy the requirements of a given AAL, a claimant SHALL be authenticated with at least a given level of strength to be recognized as a subscriber. The result of an authentication process is an identifier that SHALL be used each time that subscriber authenticates to that RP. The identifier MAY be pseudonymous. Subscriber identifiers SHOULD NOT be reused for a different subject but SHOULD be reused when a previously-enrolled subject is re-enrolled by the CSP. Other attributes that identify the subscriber as a unique subject MAY also be provided.


Periodic reauthentication of subscriber sessions SHALL be performed as described in Section 7.2. At AAL1, reauthentication of the subscriber SHOULD be repeated at least once per 30 days during an extended usage session, regardless of user activity. The session SHOULD be terminated (i.e., logged out) when this time limit is reached.


At AAL2, authentication SHALL occur by the use of either a multi-factor authenticator or a combination of two single-factor authenticators. A multi-factor authenticator requires two factors to execute a single authentication event, such as a cryptographically-secure device with an integrated biometric sensor that is required to activate the device. Authenticator requirements are specified in Section 5.


Cryptographic authenticators used at AAL2 SHALL use approved cryptography. Authenticators procured by government agencies SHALL be validated to meet the requirements of FIPS 140 Level 1. Software-based authenticators that operate within the context of an operating system MAY, where applicable, attempt to detect compromise of the platform in which they are running (e.g., by malware) and SHOULD NOT complete the operation when such a compromise is detected. At least one authenticator used at AAL2 SHALL be replay resistant as described in Section 5.2.8. Authentication at AAL2 SHOULD demonstrate authentication intent from at least one authenticator as discussed in Section 5.2.9.


When a device such as a smartphone is used in the authentication process, the unlocking of that device (typically done using a PIN or biometric) SHALL NOT be considered one of the authentication factors. Generally, it is not possible for a verifier to know that the device had been locked or if the unlock process met the requirements for the relevant authenticator type.


When a biometric factor is used in authentication at AAL2, the performance requirements stated in Section 5.2.3 SHALL be met, and the verifier SHOULD make a determination that the biometric sensor and subsequent processing meet these requirements.


Periodic reauthentication of subscriber sessions SHALL be performed as described in Section 7.2. At AAL2, authentication of the subscriber SHALL be repeated at least once per 12 hours during an extended usage session, regardless of user activity. Reauthentication of the subscriber SHALL be repeated following any period of inactivity lasting 30 minutes or longer. The session SHALL be terminated (i.e., logged out) when either of these time limits is reached.


Reauthentication of a session that has not yet reached its time limit MAY require only a memorized secret or a biometric in conjunction with the still-valid session secret. The verifier MAY prompt the user to cause activity just before the inactivity timeout.


Communication between the claimant and verifier SHALL be via an authenticated protected channel to provide confidentiality of the authenticator output and resistance to MitM attacks. At least one cryptographic authenticator used at AAL3 SHALL be verifier impersonation resistant as described in Section 5.2.5 and SHALL be replay resistant as described in Section 5.2.8. All authentication and reauthentication processes at AAL3 SHALL demonstrate authentication intent from at least one authenticator as described in Section 5.2.9.


Multi-factor authenticators used at AAL3 SHALL be hardware cryptographic modules validated at FIPS 140 Level 2 or higher overall with at least FIPS 140 Level 3 physical security. Single-factor cryptographic devices used at AAL3 SHALL be validated at FIPS 140 Level 1 or higher overall with at least FIPS 140 Level 3 physical security.


When a biometric factor is used in authentication at AAL3, the verifier SHALL make a determination that the biometric sensor and subsequent processing meet the performance requirements stated in Section 5.2.3.


Periodic reauthentication of subscriber sessions SHALL be performed as described in Section 7.2. At AAL3, authentication of the subscriber SHALL be repeated at least once per 12 hours during an extended usage session, regardless of user activity, as described in Section 7.2. Reauthentication of the subscriber SHALL be repeated following any period of inactivity lasting 15 minutes or longer. Reauthentication SHALL use both authentication factors. The session SHALL be terminated (i.e., logged out) when either of these time limits is reached. The verifier MAY prompt the user to cause activity just before the inactivity timeout.


This section provides the detailed requirements specific t


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